The Rebel by Geoffrey R. Skoll
Chapter 10
The Rebel
Rebels have many ways to revolt. Rulers have only two ways to resist them: terror and restraint. Rulers either control the masses through fear—
the way Machiavelli recommended in The Prince—or they use physical or 
symbolic restraints. Typically, rulers employ both kinds of restraints. Late 
modern strategies of restraints increasingly took an actuarial approach. 
Focusing on penology in the United States, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan 
Simon (1992) identified a shift, beginning in the 1970s, away from what 
they called the old penology towards a new penology. The old penology 
concerned individual miscreants, measuring responsibility according to 
moral sensibilities: using diagnosis, intervention, and treatment of individ-
ual offenders. The new penology “is concerned with techniques to  identify, 
classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness. The task is mana-
gerial, not transformative. . . . It seeks to regulate levels of deviance . . .” 
(452). The new penology tends more toward the impersonal and bureau-
cratic, a sort of free market conception of crime control where regulatory 
techniques control the market in crime much as monetary regulation 
controls financial markets in the neoliberal economy. State bureaucracies, 
including but by no means limited to those overseeing criminal justice, 
prioritize the risks of betrayal and disloyalty, foreign invasion, and civil 
war (Simon 2001:22); or most pertinently, revolt.
Despite the apparent ultrarationality of the actuarial strategy, postmod-
ern states continually turn to physical force and coercion. The penal system 
in the United States testifies to just such a reliance of physical restraint. The 
overt military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq show how much imperial 
ambitions continue to rely on the most extreme forms of violence. More 
covert, or at least deniable, applications of massive military might apply to 
Pakistan and the clandestine military operations in east Africa and Iran with 
proxy mercenary forces applied in Colombia and other areas of strategic 
and economic interest. A third form of physical force relies on technologies 
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of crowd control. Years in research and development; some of these technol-
ogies have begun to appear on the streets only recently. In Pittsburgh at the 
G20 conference in the fall 2009, police used some of them against  protesters. 
Along with the now commonplace beanbags fired from  shotguns, rubber 
bullets, Tasers, and the like, police use the Long Range Acoustic Device 
mounted on an armored personnel carrier. It produces extremely shrill and 
piercing sound to clear streets (Ferner 2009). Among the other armamen-
taria available for police to control popular protests are devices that produce 
nausea and vomiting and Raytheon’s Active Denial System designed for 
crowd control in combat zones, which uses an energy beam to induce an 
intolerable heating sensation, like a hot iron placed on the skin. It is effective 
beyond the range of small arms, in excess of 400 meters.
The strategy of terror similarly ranges from methods employed by local 
police, the restricted but symbolically significant use of capital punishment 
by state penal systems, all the way up to the global and most terrifying tech-
nology of all, the American preponderance of nuclear weapons coupled 
with worldwide delivery capabilities. While the political leadership of the 
United States continues to call for nuclear disarmament, the Pentagon also 
continually pursues a new generation of nuclear weapons (Cardinale 2009). 
Nonetheless, and despite new technologies, the strategies of repression are 
not new. In a similar vein, neither are strategies of revolt.
Revolts and revolutions need theories and models to provide intel-
lectual grounding for their strategies and actions. This chapter examines 
and critically discusses some of the most promising recent theories and 
theorists along with models of organized rebellion, both historic and con-
temporary. They all share at least one common theme: they diminish fear 
and strive for lucid consciousness.
Models of Rebellion
Revolts against oppression and exploitation have to contend with recent 
and contemporary developments and technologies in the hands of the 
elite. Globalism refers to more than globalization, a neoliberal locution 
that is really an ideological canard. Whereas globalization refers to the 
effects of lifting national protections against the penetration of inter-
national capital, globalism encompasses the opportunities presented by 
the breakdown of cultural barriers and deployment of worldwide com-
munication technologies. In concrete terms, globalism brings worldwide 
proletarian revolt within the realm of possibility.
Although presenting opportunities, globalism also, and so far, has 
facilitated repression on a global scale as never before. The U.S. military uses 
advanced electronic surveillance, weapons control, and long-range,  airborne 
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weapons systems to destroy what it deems sources of opposition to its 
hegemony. It carries out such strikes virtually anywhere on the globe using 
drones, satellite surveillance, military assassination teams, or mercenaries 
(Ackerman 2009; Marzetti 2009; Marzetti and Shane 2009). The global 
reach of U.S. military and intelligence violence, subversion, and surveillance 
militates against highly structured organizations. Similarly, technologies of 
crowd control and domestic surveillance in the metropole limit organized 
mass movements. Given such limitations and opportunities, models for 
rebellion must tend toward fluid networks with a globalized reach.
The Industrial Workers of the World
One such model comes from the early twentieth century in the United 
States. That period of U.S. history offers an analogy to the entire world a 
century later. Massive immigration from varied countries of origin, indus-
trialization, expansion of transport and communication, and concentrated 
extraction of natural resources characterized the continental United States 
then just as they characterize the entire world in the twenty-first century. 
Under those conditions, a new, indigenous revolutionary movement arose.
The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or self proclaimed 
Wobblies) formed in June 1905 in a convention of anarchists, socialists, 
syndicalists, and labor organizers. It succumbed to the Red Scare at the end 
of the First World War, although membership peaked in the early 1920s. 
After that date, splits and factions allied themselves with other organiza-
tions, largely socialist and communist. Although still extant today, the 
contemporary organization has membership of a couple of thousands at 
most with no revolutionary pretension, let alone capabilities. The IWW 
before the First World War recommends itself as an effective model for 
postmodern rebellion.
The following discussion owes its greatest debt to Salavatore Salerno’s 
1989 history and analysis, Red November, Black November. A caveat: the 
exemplary nature of the IWW for rebellion does not rest on the accuracy 
of Salerno’s account over those of Paul Brissenden (1957), Joseph Conlin 
(1969), Melvin Dubovsky (1969), or Philip Foner (1965). It rests on the 
historical IWW as Salerno depicted it. Even without his important critical 
insights, the words of the IWW’s own preamble to their constitution carry 
an important sense of their significance:
The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There 
can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of 
the working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all 
the good things of life.
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Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the 
world organize as a class, take possession of the means of production, abol-
ish the wage system, and live in harmony with the Earth.
 . . . 
Instead of the conservative motto, “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work,” 
we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, “Abolition of 
the wage system.” 
It is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism. 
(Preamble 2005)
The IWW developed an ideology by amalgamating elements of anarchism, 
Marxism, socialism, and syndicalism into its own unique and indigenous 
North American version. Although it had an organizational structure, 
especially prior to the First World War, that structure resembled more a 
network of locals than a bureaucracy. While often regarded mainly as a 
labor organization, the organizational aspects of the movement remained 
secondary to its revolutionary movement character. As a movement, 
instead of merely a labor union, it relied on its members to take tactical 
actions toward those ends set forth in the preamble: taking possession of 
the means of production, abolition of the wage system, eliminating capi-
talism, and living in harmony with the earth. In contradistinction to every 
other labor organization contemporary with it, the IWW advocated for 
and, to a remarkable extent, practiced gender and racial equality. Part of 
their strategy aimed at unified action among the many recent immigrants 
to the United States who came during the last part of the nineteenth and 
first part of the twentieth century. Many of them did not speak English, 
and they had no common language. Wobbly newsletters and other writ-
ings routinely published in several different languages. Nonetheless, the 
IWW also relied heavily on nonverbal communications using images and 
music to convey its revolutionary agitation.
The founders of the IWW relied on and often included many anarchists 
of the 1880s from Chicago, who today gain their main notoriety from the 
Haymarket Affair of 1886 (Avrich 1984; Green 2006). Those roots lent a 
libertarian tone to the IWW. Another historical influence, mainly ideo-
logical, but also strategic; came from contemporary French syndicalism 
through the Confédération Générale du Travail, or CGT. “The I. W. W. 
considered French syndicalism a particular manifestation of industrial 
unionism. . . . The early Wobblies believed that they were in a position to 
learn from the experience of the French syndicalists and improve on the 
contributions made by French syndicalists to revolutionary  unionism” 
(Salerno 1989:95). The central motif of industrial unionism played a 
role in both ideology and strategy. Wobbly intellectuals recognized the 
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recent developments of capitalism as creating a new kind of  industrialism 
that relied on machines rather than personal skills. V. I. Lenin (1917) 
and Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1914, 1921, 1923) made parallel analyses, 
which Harry Braverman (1974) explicated more recently. Consequently, 
Wobblies viewed the already established craft unions as obsolete. Their 
analysis stressed not only the machine technology but also the social rela-
tions that went with those new forces of production.
Several strategies became part of the IWW panoply. Each went through 
development and modification within the pre–First World War thought. 
From the French, they adapted the general strike. The French conceived of 
the general strike as a peaceful refusal to work, in which workers in many 
industries simultaneously laid down their tools for several days with the 
objective of paralyzing the country (Salerno 1989:101–102). Wobblies 
criticized this approach, arguing that a strike that separates workers from 
their tools “is a strike that can be settled with machine guns” (104), an 
astute observation still relevant in the twenty-first century. To the general 
strike, the IWW added the general lockout, a lockout not of workers but 
of capitalists, in which workers would seize the means of production. 
Workers would occupy the factories instead of leaving them. In the centers 
of postmodern capitalism, with their dearth of factory production, the 
basic strategy would take a different form than that of say, the famous sit-
down strikes of the 1930s.
The IWW always maintained a kind of grassroots principle in which 
tactical success depended on the initiative, ingenuity, and intelligence of 
workers who adapted to fluid conditions and did not limit themselves to 
particular tactics. While recognizing the importance of local conditions for 
effective action, the IWW linked local struggles to workers throughout the 
world, demonstrating that their name was not mere rhetoric.
the capitalist class throughout the world, through their pliant tools, are 
watching every move of the proletarians, for fear that methods adopted 
successfully in the conflicts of one land may be copied in another. . . . But 
knowledge is power; and to know the fighting methods applied by Industrial 
Unionists in every land the globe over . . . is one of the essential requisites of 
those who struggle and strive. 
(Salerno 1989:108)
Another strategy the IWW employed and advocated was sabotage. 
What that meant depended heavily on individual interpretations and 
 activists. In the capitalist press, sabotage often came to mean terrorism 
and  wrecking. Those tactics rarely applied to what Wobblies actually did. 
Instead, sabotage involved a tactic of what many called passive resistance 
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or passive action. It usually meant producing poor products and  diverting 
 productive capacities away from capitalist gain—think of so-called time 
stealing in which today’s cubicle workers surf the Internet instead of 
attending to assigned tasks.
Wobblies used art as a sort of mix between ideology, strategy, and orga-
nizing methods. Art also adapted to the necessity of cultural pluralism 
inherent in the social conditions of early twentieth-century America.
The effort to link art to revolutionary struggle, as a means of both dis-
seminating political ideology and creating a worker’s culture that challenged 
the definition of American life imposed by government and business elites, 
defined the major motif which emerged from the practice of Wobbly artists.
This culture was built on the initiative of rank-and-file workers and 
reflected their struggles, hopes, and aspirations. The labor radicalism of the 
I.W.W. was not rigidly drawn from a single ideological source. . . . Informed 
by diverse, often contradictory, sources of influence, the I.W.W.’s labor 
radicalism formed a complex mixture of inherent and derived forms of 
knowledge and lived experience. 
(Salerno 1989:140)
Using art meant relying on iconic representation more heavily than most 
propaganda. Their art opposed elite and indeed all class culture that was 
not working class. Their art was political because of its essential oppo-
sitional nature, iconically representing rebellion. Their art was political 
because it was rebellious as was the entire Wobbly sensibility.
Wobblies replaced the institutional basis of unionism with a conception of 
culture and community that was primary and constitutive. They created and 
used cultural expressions as a means of unifying workers and as a basis to 
move against the repressive social conditions of industrial development that 
extended beyond the point of production. 
(Salerno 1989:149)
The Wobblies fought resistance, obfuscation, and repression with con-
certed direct action, not relying on representatives in the approved 
political sphere. They remained incorrigible because they revolted. The 
Wobblies embodied Camus’ injunction: “I revolt, therefore we are.”
The Bolivarian Revolution
The Bolivarian revolution refers to the revolution begun in Venezuela at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. In fact, the official name of Venezuela 
became the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Led by Hugo Chávez 
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Frias, elected president in 1998, the revolution started as a restoration 
of liberal democracy. Chávez declared its socialist character in January 
2005 (Wilpert 2007:3). Of course, as with similar policy pronouncements 
from many different political leaders, its socialism remains undefined 
and vague. Its Bolivarianism, however, consists of national sovereignty, 
social justice, an emphasis on education, Latin American integration, and 
 civilian-military unity (16).
The namesake for the revolution, Simon Bolivar (1783–1830), earned 
the honorific title “Liberator” because he orchestrated the liberation 
of what are now the northern countries of South America—Bolivia, 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela—from Spain. Bolivar’s own ideology fol-
lowed the Enlightenment liberal thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau and 
Adam Smith, most prominently.
Chávez leads a cabinet and cadre of leftists culled from an array of 
political parties and movements. First elected president mainly by the 
middle class, many turned against him when he removed the former 
governing elite from positions of power. They in turn mounted a politi-
cal, public relations, and eventually a violent campaign against him. The 
efforts of the Opposition, as they were called, culminated in a mildly 
violent coup in April 2002. They forcibly removed Chávez from office 
and held him prisoner. In the four years of his presidency, he had pro-
moted reforms favoring the poor using the burgeoning oil revenues of the 
period to finance social security and education. His base of support shifted 
from the middle classes to the impoverished, who gave him his reelection 
victory in 2004 with a sizeable majority. When Venezuela had suffered the 
Washington-led neoliberalism shared by many Latin American countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s, it boasted the largest increase in poverty of all, 
rising to a poverty rate of approximately 43 percent of the population at 
the end of the millennium (Weisbrot et al. 2009:9). It was largely they, 
the poor, who thwarted the coup by marching into Caracas from the sur-
rounding barrios by the hundreds of thousands demanding his return. The 
Revolution Will Not Be Televised (Bartley and Donnacha 2003) presents a 
video graphic record of these events. Since the 2002 coup and especially 
since the failure of the recall election against him in 2004, the Chávez 
government has engineered a reduction in poverty from its high mark of 
54 percent in early 2003 to 26 percent at the end of 2008, while extreme 
poverty declined from 16.6 percent to 7 percent (Weisbrot et al. 2009:9).
In addition to promoting a massive shift toward economic equality, mea-
sured by a seven-point drop in the Gini index (10), the Bolivarian Republic 
established political reforms mainly through the new constitution adopted 
in 1999. Political reform accompanied social reform. In Chávez’ terms, 
democracy should be both participatory and proactive to achieve the 
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“socialism of the political” (Wilpert 2007:239). The Bolivarian Republic 
set up so-called “missions,” which would probably be called  “programs” in 
the United States, such as the antipoverty programs of Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society of the 1960s. Each mission had a particular social reform 
agenda. They also had the advantage of bypassing the conservative and 
corrupt bureaucracy of the state, which was also beset by cronyism among 
the Opposition who controlled much of it (Gott 2005:256). 
The Mission Barrio Adentro provided community health care. By the 
end of 2004, more than 13,000 physicians from Cuba assisted by 5,000 
Venezuelan personnel in allied health professions spread throughout the 
country, concentrating in impoverished rural and urban areas. Provided 
with materials and expertise from Caracas, denizens of the locales built 
their own clinics to house the medical staff, equipment, and medicines. 
Mission Robinson, taken from Simon Bolivar’s mentor, Simon Rodriguez’ 
pen name, spurred literacy, increasing it to one of the highest rates in Latin 
America, mainly by using the new constitution as its basic instructional 
text. The Mission Ribas gave two years instruction and a small stipend 
to young adults who had dropped out of school. Named after José Felix 
Ribas—husband to Simon Bolivar’s aunt and participant in the wars of 
independence—it gave night-school instruction in grammar, mathematics, 
geography, and a second language. 600,000 students were enrolled in 2004. 
Mission Sucre gave 70,000 students with a high school diploma additional 
education so they could enter universities. Mission Vuelvan Caras helped 
the unemployed find work. Mission Identidad was a voter-registration drive. 
Three missions concentrated in rural areas: Mission Zamora instituted land 
reform and redistribution to poor peasants; Mission Guaicaipuro aimed 
at restoring tribal land and ensuring human rights to indigenous peoples 
of Venezuela; Mission Mercal operates supermarkets and distributes food 
to urban populations, and it supports food cooperatives selling generic 
products at a 50 percent discount. Mission Mercal aims to restore agricul-
tural self-sufficiency to Venezuela after neoliberalism destroyed domestic 
food production. It also promotes organic, cooperative gardening in urban 
areas (Gott 2005:257–259). In the governmental sphere, the Bolivarian 
Republic strengthened control over the state-owned oil industry, Petróleos 
de Venezuela. The National Assembly enlarged the Supreme Court by sev-
enteen new judges and increased the total from twenty to thirty two. Also, a 
new media law brought Venezuela in line with countries in Western Europe 
ensuring public control over the airways and made privately owned outlets 
legally liable for fomenting treason and spreading libel.
Generally, since 2002—especially after the failure of the oil industry 
lockout and shutdown begun in late 2003—and continuing into 2004, the 
Bolivarian Republic has used laws and programs to promote democracy, 
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reduce poverty, and encourage grass roots self-determination in all sectors 
of the population. Whether or not such initiatives are twenty-first century 
socialism remains debatable. Nonetheless, it does not resemble the statism 
of the former Soviet Union, or the milquetoast reformism of European 
social democracy. Chávez characterized it as reclaiming socialism as a 
thesis by putting humans ahead of machines and people ahead of the state 
(Wilpert 2007:238).
The Bolivarian revolution provides a model because of its ideals and 
stated goals and because it has been nonviolent. It is the first self-proclaimed 
socialist revolution that has not taken over the state through violent revo-
lution but by peaceful political struggle. Moreover, its leadership repeat-
edly acknowledges, indeed insists, that what they have achieved only sets 
the stage for the real revolution, which the people, not a vanguard, must 
prosecute.
Democracy
The Wobblies and the Bolivarian Revolution offer models for rebellion 
because both incline toward democracy. Cleisthenes (fl. c.515–495 BCE) 
created the eponym of democracy in his constitution of 508 BCE by wrest-
ing politics from clans and giving it to demes. The demes cut across kin-
ship hierarchy, which had been the ancient form of government of Athens. 
By dividing the population into demes for making collective decisions, 
traditional authority gave way to political authority. Nonetheless, the 
meaning of democracy has forever been in dispute, as historically and cur-
rently tyrants rule in its name. Solon (c. 638–558 BCE) had already intro-
duced government by lot whereby state officials gained office by chance. 
More a conceptual contribution to democracy than a democratic practice, 
Cleisthenes’ constitution explicitly gave power to the people through their 
courts. Successive reforms gradually eliminated seats of inherited, aristo-
cratic power in favor of popular participation. Democracy separates col-
lective decision making from other social powers arising from kinship and 
concentrations of wealth. Therefore, democracy does not just presume a 
fiction of equality, it requires real equality. Further, it enlarges the public 
sphere at the expense of the private sphere. These two fundamental themes 
give the lie to the democratic claims of all the so-called liberal democracies 
governing most of the world. Jacques Rancière (2008:73) called them state 
oligarchies in which the state modulates oligarchic rule while ensuring 
nonthreatening liberties to the masses. Finally, democracy institutionalizes 
rebellion in politics.
Understanding the relation between democracy and rebellion requires 
a review of what democracy is not. In recent times self-proclaimed  radical 
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democrats, many of whose ideas comport with popular power, often 
frame democracy in terms of forms of its function. A common device 
welds democracy to republican forms, that is, representative democracy. 
As Rancière pointed out, however, “Originally, representation was the 
exact contrary of democracy.” The founders of the United States, oligarchs 
almost to a man, constructed the republic so that the elite could exercise 
de facto power (53). “The idea of the republic is one of a system of institu-
tions, laws and moral values that eliminate democratic excess by making 
the state and society homogeneous” (68). So, for instance, the business of 
Congress is hedged in by owners’ boxes. Neither does democracy equate 
with meritocracy; the idea that the best should rule. This concept owes 
its gravitas if not its origin to Plato, a founding father of antidemocracy. 
Voting and elections, a common measure of democracy, have little claim 
to its essence. Mechanisms that rely on the Solonic institution of choos-
ing officials by lot have purer democratic credentials. Behind election by 
chance lies the presumption of popular rule. If the people really are to 
rule, then any one of them has the right, and perhaps even the duty, to 
rule. Besides, election by lot counteracts the tendency for those who desire 
power to receive it. Furthermore, election by popular vote, even assum-
ing an ideal electoral process and an ideal electorate, would yield at best a 
technocracy, which weds government by natural elites—the smartest, for 
example—combined with the social power of those with expert compe-
tencies with the power of wealth (69).
Instead of the formalizations of democracy advocated by such as Chantal 
Mouffe (1992) or Selya Benhabib (1996) for instance, democracy enacts the 
political. Its direct antagonist is institution: the propensity to establish routines 
and make permanent decisions. Democracy means perpetual contest, revers-
ible decisions, and the barring of oligarchic influence from wealth, expertise, 
or force. Sometimes the intellectual antonym of an idea serves to clarify. 
The thought of Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist, represents just such a clarifying 
opposite. Of course Schmitt was no friend of parliamentarism. He viewed it 
as dangerous, because it yielded to the influence of parties and factions. His 
solution was not, on the contrary, democratic participation by all the people. 
He advocated what has been summed up as decisionism. In decisionism, 
an executive sovereign takes the power of legislation along with absolute 
 executive power to resolve a state of emergency (Schmitt 1923, 1927). Events 
of the time in Weimar Germany realized Schmitt’s concept, which ended 
with the ultimate in decisionism: ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. Setting aside 
extreme tyrannies, prior attempts to establish democracy through revolution 
have all ended in the reinforcement of the state. Revolution seems always 
to have subverted both rebellion and democracy by augmenting govern-
ment at the expense of the political. “[T]he strange and terrifying growth of 
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the  modern state can be considered as the logical conclusion of inordinate 
technical and philosophical ambitions, foreign to the true spirit of rebellion” 
(Camus 1956:177). The trick remains to achieve the political without an 
excess of government, without the state. The fascist revolutions achieved the 
opposite as they, especially the Nazis, realized twentieth century nihilism on a 
scale never before imagined. The Nazi nihilism substituted action for reason, 
deifying the irrational (177–178). Perpetual action without reflection, with-
out lucid consciousness, eventuates in a society based on the meaningless. 
When the metanarratives disappear, as Lyotard characterized postmodern-
ism, “history is only written in terms of the hazards of force. . . . the Hitlerian 
revolution represented unadulterated dynamism” (178).
The Nazi nihilism explains that while democracy is not a matter of 
republican forms, neither is it populism. Hitler was nothing if not popular. 
The German people adored him. Such is the danger of populism. Today’s 
populism tends toward the fascist; Jacques Rancière called it postpolitics 
(1995) parallel with postfeminism, the postracial and all the other “posts.” 
The populisms in the United States and Western Europe build on a heavy 
strain of racism, antiimmigrant sentiment, and antiintellectualism found in 
the election of George W. Bush by, among others, the prototypical NASCAR 
enthusiasts, the good old boys (and girls) of the South and West. 
There is always something of this trick in populism. So, not only is populism 
not the arena within which today’s emancipatory projects should inscribe 
themselves, but one should even go a step further and propose that the main 
task of emancipatory politics, its life-and-death problem, is to find a form of 
political mobilization that, while (like populism) is critical of institutional-
ized politics, will avoid the populist temptation. 
(Žižek 2008a:268–269)
Populism lacks two elements essential to democracy. First, in the words of 
Maximilien Robespierre, democracy needs “that deep horror of tyranny . . . 
and holy love for humanity, without which a great revolution is just a noisy 
crime that destroys another crime” (Robespierre 2007:129). The second 
lack of populism is class struggle. That is what distinguishes Robespierre 
from Danton. Conservative historians lay the blame of the Thermidor 
counterrevolution at the feet of Robespierre and Saint Just and the Terror; 
it more rightly belongs to Danton who did not see the Terror as an expres-
sion of the people’s virtue. Danton did not speak for the people, but as 
their representative, as an embodiment of what was to become bourgeois 
democracy. He said “Let us be terrible so that the people will not have to be” 
(Žižek 2008a:415). Thermidore was the statist  resolution of Danton’s, and 
others’, bourgeois revolution. The Thermidorean constitution of Year III 
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established a property-qualified voting system for which only 30,000 citi-
zens qualified and a prohibition of popular assembly: Article 366 states, 
“Every unarmed gathering shall be dispersed,” and, “No association may 
present them collectively, except the constituted authorities, and the only 
for matters within their jurisdiction” (Badiou 1998:125–126). Citing 
Boissy d’Anglas as exemplary, Alain Badiou noted that the Thermidor 
regime established government by the past, by which they meant those 
owning substantial property, with that same government extended to the 
colonized. “[T]he colonies belong to France because we have property 
there; the law must ‘pacify’ the independence movement’s emancipatory 
fervour because it threatens this property; and finally direct administrative 
control of these colonies is desirable because our security is at stake” (131). 
The resonance with suppression of popular protests at the G20 summit of 
2009 in Pittsburgh along with the essentially imperialistic War on Terror 
and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq should be obvious. With respect to 
the so-called wars for security, Badiou observed that “we have (and will 
have, too, if the USA continues in Somalia and in Iraq, etc.) war as an 
abstract form of theatrical capture of an adversary (‘terrorism’), which is 
in its essence vague and elusive. The war against nothing: itself subtracted 
from the very idea of war” (Badiou 2006:28–29). 
The virtue of the people expressed by Robespierre and Saint Just bore 
the mark of the times, preceding the flowering of industrial capitalism 
in the nineteenth century. Therefore, it spoke of virtue instead of class 
struggle. Nonetheless class struggle by the working class remains critical 
for democracy. The reason is that the working class struggles against all 
class relations, and therefore can act as the universal class, which in the end 
dissolves itself. The question for today’s rebel concerns the whereabouts of 
today’s proletariat. They are found in the inhabitants of slums in the new 
megalopolises composed of marginalized workers, sacked civil servants, 
and landless peasants. Created by the neoliberal global economy, they 
join their cousins in the banlieues, ghettos, and favelas of the metropoles. 
Today they remain unorganized as a class and therefore unconscious of 
themselves as constituting a class.
What one finds in the “really-existing slums” is, of course, a mixture of 
improvised modes of social life, from criminal gangs and religious “funda-
mentalist” groups held together by a charismatic leader up to and including 
seeds of new forms of “socialist” solidarity. 
(Žižek 2008a:425)
They are not too different from the Parisian sansculottes of the eighteenth 
century, the constituency of the Jacobins, of Robespierre, and of Saint 
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Just. They also resemble the workers at whom the Wobblies aimed their 
organizing efforts in the early twentieth century in the United States. In 
the twenty-first century, Hugo Chávez founded his Bolivarian Revolution 
on them. He mobilized the people of the barrios around Caracas and the 
other major urban centers in Venezuela. His radical democracy expressly 
embraces the horror of tyranny and love of humanity espoused by 
Robespierre. Anyone who watches Chávez on television when surrounded 
by Venezuelans can have no doubt about the latter. Moreover, he has been 
working to prepare them for class struggle.
The course on which Chavez embarked from 2006 is the exact opposite of 
the postmodern Left’s mantra regarding de-territorialization, rejection of 
statist politics, and so on: far from “resisting state power,” he grabbed power 
(first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the state 
apparatuses and interventions to promote his goals; furthermore he is mili-
tarizing the favelas, organizing the training of armed units. 
(Žižek 2008a:427)
Militarizing the favelas does not mean putting armed functionaries of the 
state into them. Just the opposite, it means arming the denizens of them. 
As noted above, the Bolivarian Revolution does not just arm them; it edu-
cates them, encourages their industry, and promotes their inclusion and 
participation in the polity. If that does not support class struggle, nothing 
does. That is why the Bolivarian Revolution is the clearest example of radi-
cal democracy in the twenty-first century, the best example of emancipa-
tory politics, and the real material expression of rebellion.
Jihad and Dirty Hands
Jihad, originally a word derived from the Koran and other classic Islamic 
texts, has entered contemporary American English. The fourth edition of 
the American Heritage Dictionary (2007) has the following entry:
 1. Islam: An individual’s striving for spiritual self-perfection.
 2. Islam: A Muslim holy war or spiritual struggle against infidels.
 3. A crusade or struggle: “The war against smoking is turning into a 
jihad against people who smoke” (Fortune).
  [Arabic jih d, from jahada, to strive; see ghd in Semitic roots.]
Americanized, it occasionally comes into dispute between those who 
emphasize the first meaning, a spiritual struggle within individuals, versus 
the second meaning implying violence and theocratic chauvinism, largely 
188  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
directed against the West and especially the world capitalist hegemon. U.S. 
soldiers and some others have taken to using a variation, “jihadis,” as a 
term for what more polite reportage calls “militants” or “insurgents.” Such 
terminology includes the category of terrorists, meaning those individuals 
and groups using violence against Western states with a strong connotation 
of Islamic terrorists. Jihadi has come to play a linguistic role similar to that 
of “gook” during the Vietnam War—that is, any enemy and more generally 
any non-American. Despite such heavy loading, jihad is a perfectly good 
word referring to struggle, whether violent or not. As such, it could easily 
serve to augment the term “class struggle” that long ago acquired a nega-
tive association among polite company—that is, among the bourgeoisie—
especially in the United States.
“Dirty hands” has an even more varied set of meanings. One of the more 
straightforward acts as the antonym to the clean hands doctrine in equity 
law. Under the clean hands doctrine the law denies equitable relief to anyone 
whose prior conduct has violated conscience, good faith, or any other equi-
table principle. In sum, “one seeking equitable relief cannot take advantage 
of one’s own wrong” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1983). This legal definition has 
relevance because the concept of equitable relief relies on established state 
power to judge and grant it, and assumes parties in equity have agreed to 
submit to its power and authority. Another usage comes from social science. 
Everett C. Hughes used the term “dirty hands” to adjure social researchers, 
arguing that to do enlightening and intelligent research one had to dirty one’s 
hands (1958). Implicit in Hughes’ methodology is the concept that social 
research had to engage with real people and real situations. Researchers ought 
not to hold themselves aloof if they hope to find the truth. Alain Badiou iden-
tified another source of dirty hands—dirty money. “It is entirely legitimate to 
stipulate axiomatically that, beyond a certain sum, when one starts calculat-
ing in the tens of millions, all capitalist money is bound to be dirty” (Badiou 
1998:132). Those who handle dirty money perforce have dirty hands. Finally, 
the fourth, and most relevant meaning for the present discussion, relates to 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1948 play by that title. 
The plot of Dirty Hands centers on a political assassination. It is set in 
a fictional eastern European country between 1943 and 1945. A young 
Communist, Hugo Barine, is told that Hoederer, a party leader, has proposed 
talks with the other non-Socialist groups, including the fascist government 
and the liberal and nationalist-led resistance. The idea is to set up a joint resis-
tance group opposing the Germans, and a postwar coalition government. 
Hugo feels that Hoederer’s policy smacks of treachery. Louis, another party 
leader, has decided that Hoederer must die. He grudgingly agrees to let Hugo, 
who has more commitment than experience, do the job. In the end, Hugo 
does assassinate Hoederer, but neither the character Hugo nor the audience 
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can be certain whether Hugo acted mainly from adherence to party discipline 
or jealousy over his wife, or possibly an inextricable mixture of motives. In 
any case, the play raises moral and political issues for rebellion.
First, rebels cannot, and many would say, should not, excise personal emo-
tions from their rebellion. After all, a central goal of rebellion is humanism. 
Second, there is the question of whether a rebel can afford personal moral 
purity when exigencies of political conflict require submersion of individual 
interests in favor of the common good. In such circumstances, innocence 
remains unattainable, despite protestations to the contrary. Pleading with 
Hugo not to go through with the assassination, Jessica his wife says
I don’t want to choose: I don’t want you to get yourself killed and I don’t 
want you to kill him. . . . I don’t understand this whole business and I wash 
my hands of it. I am neither an oppressor nor a class traitor nor a revolu-
tionary. I’ve done nothing. I am innocent of everything. 
(Sartre 1949:215)
Of course, Jessica’s innocence cannot be. There can be and in fact are no 
bystanders in the kind of fundamental struggle taking place in the setting 
of the play. Having discovered Hugo’s assignment to kill him, Hoederer 
says to him 
How you cling to your purity young man! How afraid you are to soil your 
hands! All right, stay pure! . . . Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the 
elbows. I’ve plunged them in filth and blood. . . . If you don’t love men, you 
can’t fight for them (223–225). 
Robespierre and Saint Just faced the same dilemma. For the love of the 
people, they had to murder. Another twist to the dirty hands conundrum 
pervades Stalinism, particularly the Stalinist terror and purges, especially 
when it came to the purge of the party leaders. Stalin and his Central 
Committee supporters accused Bolshevik leaders like Nikolai Bukharin 
(1888–1938) of objective guilt. For Bukharin that meant that, as a major 
Marxist theoretician as well as a functionary in the Soviet government, he 
had to support the revolution, never deviating from the party line, and 
always adhering to Lenin’s doctrine of democratic centralism. The Lenin 
doctrine meant that party leaders could dispute and disagree within their 
own ranks, in effect, in closed meetings. To the people, however, they must 
present a united front. Stalin jettisoned the democratic part of Lenin’s 
doctrine so that by 1938, the year of Bukharin’s purge trial, the only line 
possible was Stalin’s, whether within the closed circles of party leader-
ship or outside it. Furthermore, deviation was not permitted. The rule 
applied to genuine disagreement, or even to positions taken which might 
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 miscalculate exactly what party line prevailed, or even more insidiously, 
would prevail. “[I]n the Stalinist universe there are ultimately no dupes, 
and everyone knows the ‘objective meaning’ of their acts, disagreement 
with the party line can only be the result of direct hypocrisy and deceit” 
(Žižek 2008a:235). This is consequentialism taken to its extreme. That 
is, people are always completely responsible for the consequences of 
their acts, even if they cannot foresee those consequences. Outside of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union of the 1930s, which Žižek aptly compares to Kafka’s 
The Trial (1914), the concepts of objective guilt and dirty hands bear on 
the role of rebels.
Failing to act—Jessica’s defense in Dirty Hands—does not absolve any-
one, because as Trotsky observed, those who stand apart from the revolu-
tion, act against it. “[I]n a time of revolution standing on the wall involves 
great danger. . . . The priests of ‘conciliatory justice’ are usually found sitting 
inside the four walls waiting to see which side will win” (Trotsky 1930:xiii). 
Karl Jaspers offered a broader, and perhaps more poignant, assessment of 
objective guilt in reviewing the burden all Germans bore for Nazism. In 
his series of lectures, published as The Question of German Guilt (1948). 
He listed four categories of guilt: criminal guilt (the commitment of overt 
acts), political guilt (the degree of political acquiescence in the Nazi regime), 
moral guilt (a matter of private judgment among ones friends), and meta-
physical guilt (a universally shared responsibility of those who chose to 
remain alive rather than die in protest against Nazi atrocities). Minus the 
adherence to a party line, Jaspers rendered a more stringent standard than 
that of Stalin. What alternatives do rebels have if they want to avoid objec-
tive guilt for the evils of the current system, but still minimize those acts, 
such as murder, that carry their own, intrinsic burden of guilt?
The answer lies in correct analysis, lucid consciousness, and measured 
strategy. Outside of those jihadis who must fight against U.S., British, 
and allied occupation of their countries, rebels in the metropole need 
not resort to armed struggle. In fact, armed struggle within the United 
States is merely suicidal, and more importantly, ineffective. It is with 
that recognition that the models of the IWW, Venezuela, and some other 
rebel attempts are most useful. The Wobbly strategy of general strike and 
sabotage was nonviolent. The Bolivarian Revolution remains largely non-
violent. Strategies that recommend themselves are those of the Yes Men, 
universities in exile, and others discussed below.
Rebel Movements: Class, Gender, and Race
The failed world revolution of 1968, as Wallerstein would have it, did not 
fail because of inherent defects in the rebellious movements, although 
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they had plenty of them. Primarily, the ruling world capitalist class used 
the apparatuses of their respective states to crush them by force. Of 
course, this included the rulers in the Soviet Union, the nomenklatura, 
who headed the bureaucratic state capitalism long disguised as socialisme 
real. Nonetheless, police and military force only blunted the immediate 
uprisings of that year. The police in Chicago at the Democratic National 
Convention, the Soviet tanks on the streets of Prague, the army in Mexico 
City, and the others acted as the shock troops to thwart the rebellions for a 
moment. Similarly, the elites used force to block the revolts following the 
end of the First World War. In Germany, what was to become the Weimar 
regime with its Social Democratic leadership turned to the army, impor-
tantly abetted by the veteran paramilitary organizations like the Stahlhelm. 
In the United States, the Palmer raids virtually stamped out the IWW and 
other potentially revolutionary socialist organizations.
Dousing the immediate conflagrations of revolt would not have suf-
ficed if not followed by more fundamental and far-reaching strategies of 
repression. The history of those strategies in Germany and the United 
States led to rather different outcomes, and so too the long-term strategies 
of the ruling class varied in their effects in different countries after the ini-
tial failure of world revolution of 1968. Especially in the United States and 
Britain, one of the more successful strategies created divisions among the 
rebellious movements. The strategy eventuated in what became known as 
identity politics that appeared in the aftermath of the rebellion. It became 
manifest in the mid-1970s. Movements for racial equality, feminism, gay 
rights, and so on had once acted largely cooperatively if not in unison. The 
ruling class used all its abilities to deconstruct the cooperation at every 
level of society and culture from the ivory towers of academe to the more 
mundane, meretricious tools of market hucksterism. Once divisiveness 
had been sown, the politics of fear replaced it. 
Today’s predominant mode of politics is post-political bio-politics—an 
awesome example of theoretical jargon which, however, can be easily 
unpacked: “post-political” is a politics which claims to leave behind old 
ideological struggles and instead focus on expert management and adminis-
tration, while “bio-politics” designates the regulation of security and welfare 
of human lives as its primary goal. . . . The only way to introduce passion 
into this field . . . is through fear, a basic constituent of today’s subjectivity. 
For this reason, bio-politics is ultimately a politics of fear. . . . This is what 
separates a radical emancipatory politics from our political status quo. 
(Žižek 2008b:40)
The ever-ready tools of divisiveness served the ruling class as racial poli-
tics competed with gender politics, which in turn competed with politics 
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of sexuality, and so on. Class, always a hushed up subject in the United 
States, lurked beneath all of them, but the identity movements’ leader-
ships collaborated with the national and global elite to deny it. “Political 
correctness is the exemplary liberal form of the politics of fear [which] 
always relies on the manipulation of a paranoid ochlos or multitude: it 
is the frightening rally of frightened people” (41). One of the main tasks 
for today’s rebel, therefore, depends on dampening the fear by undoing 
divisiveness. Since principal fissures in U.S. society are and perennially 
have been class, gender, and race, rebellious movements focusing on each 
must see ways to kit them together so as to work toward emancipatory 
politics.
Racial Politics
Commenting on the riots of 2005 in the Paris banlieues, Slavoj Žižek 
called them a case of phatic communication. Finding parallels with 
1968, he said. “if May ‘68 was a revolt with a utopian vision, the 2005 
revolt was just an outburst with no pretence to vision. . . . There were no 
particular demands made by the protesters. . . . There was only an insis-
tence on recognition based on a vague, unarticulated ressentiment” (Žižek 
2008b:774–775). Perhaps they were not so parallel with 1968, but instead 
with the urban riots in many U.S. cities during the late 1960s. True, those 
“civil disturbances” as the Kerner Commission called them (National 
Advisory Commission 1968) also insisted on recognition and expressed 
ressentiment, but they had, just as for those of the banlieues, deep his-
torical roots coupled with contemporary injuries, and immediate sparks. 
Not insignificantly, the spark of the 2005 riots was the same as those that 
the Kerner Commission identified for riots of the 1960s: police brutality, 
abuse, and insensitivity to the people, coherent with a persistent racism. 
One of the most important parallels resides in an insight offered by Gerald 
Horne (1995) about the Watts uprising of 1965. He attributed much of 
the middle-range cause of the explosion to the fact that Black residents 
of Los Angeles had been systematically deprived of channels and levers 
of political redress for the preceding several decades. In the midst of such 
“outbursts without vision,” per Žižek, a movement and organization took 
shape that addressed both the triggering spark of the riots and its middle-
range causes—the Black Panther Party.
Originally the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense combined the poli-
tics of racial liberation and equality with an incisive political-economic 
ideology and class analysis. Bobby Seale and Huey P. Newton founded the 
organization in fall 1966 and set forth a doctrine calling for the  protection 
of Black neighborhoods from police brutality and injustice for Black 
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Americans. The Panthers also extended the call for racial justice to all the 
colonized peoples of the world. Seale said they self-consciously directed 
their organizing toward “lumpen proletarian Afro-Americans [in] put-
ting together the ideology of the Black Panther Party” (Seale 1970:ix). He 
went on to say that by doing so, they contradicted the Marxian dictum 
that the lumpen proletariat was not revolutionary and often served as the 
shock troops of reaction. Despite that contradiction, Panthers’ ideology 
and analyses were broadly Marxist to which they added the important 
influence of Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961). The police crushed the orga-
nization by force (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990 a, b), but while they 
persisted they succeeded in mobilizing Black people throughout the 
United States and built coalitions and connections with other rebellious 
organizations and movements such as the Weatherman faction and the 
Brown Berets, a Latino group. Moreover, within the organization and 
through their organizing and propaganda, they did not fail to recognize 
the importance of overcoming gender inequality and other injustices 
(Brown 1992; Hilliard and Cole 1993). Their Ten Point Program, a sort 
of party platform, remains enlightening and instructive. A synopsis 
follows. 
 1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our 
Black community.
 2. We want full employment for our people.
 3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black com-
munity.
 4. We want decent housing, fit shelter of human beings.
 5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of 
this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us 
our true history and our role in present-day society.
 6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.
 7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER 
of black people.
 8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county, and 
city jails.
 9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried by a jury 
of their peer group or people from their black communities, as 
defined by the Constitution of the United States.
 10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and 
peace. (Foner 1970:2–3). 
The Panthers Ten Point Program bears a striking resemblance to another 
program from 1944. 
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 1. The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops 
or farms or mines of the nation;
 2. The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation;
 3. The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return 
which will give him and his family a decent living;
 4. The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an 
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination 
by monopolies at home or abroad;
 5. The right of every family to a decent home;
 6. The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve 
and enjoy good health;
 7. The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, 
sickness, accident, and unemployment;
 8. The right to a good education. (Roosevelt 1944) 
The latter comes from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s State of the Union 
address, January 11, 1944. The resemblance testifies to how regressive and 
reactionary American politics has become. The FBI placed the Panthers 
on the Ten Most Wanted List, and carried out their campaign of violent 
repression against them. Today, even when identified as coming from FDR, 
his “economic Bill of Rights,” as he called it, more often than not gets the 
sobriquet of dangerously socialist. Side-by-side, the Panthers’ program 
and the FDR Economic Bill of Rights spell out minimal conditions for 
security to work toward human happiness and well being, as Roosevelt 
put it. Also, they are minimum requirements for basic democracy and 
the beginning of real, emancipatory politics. Even so, history since 1944 
and especially since the failed world revolution of 1968 and the revanchist 
reaction that ensued makes clear that the only way to work toward those 
goals remain, as always, rebellion.
Feminism and Gender Politics
Feminism as a rebel movement held great promise as it emerged in the 
1970s. It threatened a patriarchy structurally imbricated with racial and 
class oppression. Different versions of feminism emphasized different 
approaches: the political, the economic, racism, heterosexism, and so 
on. The ruling class’ counterattack was especially effective against it. The 
problem centered on the movement’s leadership and their goals. The 
National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) conference of 1990 in 
Akron, Ohio, shows these effects dramatically. The NWSA is, as the name 
implies, an outgrowth of the scholarly and academic community. The 
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leadership of the organization and conference fell to college and university 
faculty, mostly women, but not exclusively so. Faculty in women’s studies 
or most other disciplines are mostly White. They are middle class, not so 
much because of their backgrounds, but because of the position faculty 
hold in academia—they are professionals and middle management. They 
run the organization and they ran the show at the 1990 Akron annual 
conference. The conference split along lines of class, race, and sexuality. 
The Lesbian Caucus, the Poor and Working-Class Caucus, the Women of 
Color Caucus, and women’s studies staff split and withdrew. The confer-
ence ended prematurely, and no annual conference convened the following 
year. By the twenty-first century, those splits were not sutured (Helmbold 
2002; Koyama 2000; Van Dyke 2002). An anonymous memorandum 
from a group of students and staff to the women’s studies faculty at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee pithily articulated the problem. Some 
of the eight points follow:
2. We see you as walking contradictions. You oppose the so-called “White-
Boys Network” on this campus, yet you engage in the same secrecy, back-
stabbing, coverup of information, and “protection of your own.” You in 
effect perpetuate the same administration and system of oppression that 
you supposedly try to eliminate.
3. We feel that as women, and as faculty, you have disengaged . . . your 
main concerns are those of salary, daycare, and “scholarship.” . . . We feel 
these may be important issues, but only to those in your class.
4. We want to know . . is it fear?
7. Have you forgotten already what it is like to be oppressed? Have you 
ever been oppressed by other feminists before? We’re finding we have. 
(Anonymous 1992)
bell hooks summarized the elite’s strategy. “Supporting what in effect 
became white power reformist feminism enabled the mainstream white 
male patriarchy to bolster its power while simultaneously undermin-
ing the radical politics of feminism” (hooks 2000:104). Class and race 
crosscut feminism, but so do gender and sexuality. Judith Butler inter-
rogated gender and identity in Gender Trouble (1990). She questioned 
whether rebellious politics requires unity and rejected it. “Certain forms of 
acknowledged fragmentation might facilitate coalitional action precisely 
because the ‘unity’ of the category of women is neither presupposed nor 
desired” (15). Political action from a feminist standpoint need not imply 
identity politics. “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruc-
tion of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through 
which identity is articulated” (148). Feminism can contribute to rebellious 
politics, because its perspective particularly suits questioning prevailing 
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categories,  assumptions, and reifications. Not just an intellectual strategy, 
effective questioning always involves material action, refusals to go along 
with expectations, and rejection of status norms in everyday, ordinary 
life.
Promising Strategies for Rebellion
The Yes Men use imposture, satire, and parody to subvert elite structures, 
organizations, and interests. They rely heavily on iconic representation, 
electronic media, along with lawful and nonviolent confrontation. They 
deliberately confound identity, and identity politics. On the face of the web 
page at www.theyesmen.org, they describe themselves as “[i]mpersonating 
big-time criminals in order to publicly humiliate them. Targets are leaders 
and big corporations who put profits ahead of everything else.” 
October 20, 2009, the Yes Men staged an official appearing event at the 
National Press Club in Washington D.C.; one of the Yes Men announced 
that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had reversed its stance and decided 
to support current climate change legislation before Congress. A genuine 
representative of the Chamber confronted the Yes Men representative, who 
in turn promptly accused him of being an imposter (Vallis 2009).
A month earlier, on September 21, 2009—one day before a UN summit 
lead-up to the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009—over 
2000 volunteers distributed throughout New York City a 32-page “special 
edition” New York Post, with the cover story “We’re Screwed” saying that 
the city could face deadly heat waves, extreme flooding, and other lethal 
effects of global warming within the next few decades. Other articles 
describe the Pentagon’s alarmed response to global warming, the U.S. 
government’s minuscule response, China’s advanced alternative energy 
program, and how the Copenhagen climate talks could be a “Flopenhagen.” 
There is also a fake Web site, http://nypost-se.com. On September 22, 2009, 
the Yes Men demonstrated an inflatable, ball-shaped costume claiming it 
was a self-contained living system for surviving disasters caused by global 
warming. Over two-dozen people wore the SurvivaBall costumes as it was 
demonstrated in the East River. Police shut down the demonstration for 
lack of a permit. Cofounder of the Yes Men, Andy Bichlbaum, was arrested 
on an outstanding parking ticket charge and a handful of other Yes Men 
were served with summons and tickets for disorderly behavior and creat-
ing hazardous conditions. The Yes Men began their campaign in 1999 by 
hosting a Web page. The Yes Men’s first prank was the satirical Web site 
www.gwbush.com, established for the 2000 presidential election to draw 
attention to alleged hypocrisies on Bush’s actual Web site. For the 2004 
presidential campaign, they went on tour posing as the group “Yes, Bush 
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Can!” and encouraged supporters to sign a “Patriot Pledge” agreeing to 
keep nuclear waste in their backyard and send their children off to war.
Possibly their most effective direct action was on December 3, 2004, the 
twentieth anniversary of the Bhopal disaster, Andy Bichlbaum appeared 
on BBC World as “Jude Finisterra,” a Dow Chemical spokesman. Dow 
is the owner of Union Carbide, the company responsible for the chemi-
cal disaster that killed thousands and left over 120,000 requiring lifelong 
care. On their fake Dow Chemical Web site, the Yes Men said that Dow 
Chemical Company had no intention whatsoever of repairing the damage. 
The Yes Men decided to pressure Dow further, so as “Finisterra” went on 
the news to claim that Dow planned to liquidate Union Carbide and use the 
resulting twelve billion dollars to pay for medical care, clean up the site, 
and fund research into the hazards of other Dow products. After two hours 
of wide coverage, Dow issued a press release denying the statement, ensur-
ing even greater coverage of the phony news of a cleanup. By the time the 
original story was discredited, Dow’s stock had declined in value by two 
billion dollars.
Other rebellious strategies include the establishment of universities 
in exile where scholars from the centers of world capitalism can carry on 
their research, writing, and teaching without censorship, censure, or inter-
ference from elite interest and authorities. Loosely modeled on the haven 
provided to Frankfurt School scholars fleeing from the Nazi regime, even-
tually established at the New School in New York, such institutes could 
locate in welcoming countries to carry on centers of rebellion against 
hegemonic tyrannies. Jennifer Peshut (2008) who came up with the idea is 
trying to establish such an institution in Venezuela. From them, scholars 
like Ward Churchill and Norman Finkelstein, both of whom their uni-
versities ousted for their rebellious political views, could find a base and 
simultaneously augment the culture of their host country.
Finally, more a tactic than a strategy, could subvert the campaign by 
metropoles against immigrants from the periphery of world capitalism. 
Rebels could advertise that illegal immigrants are welcome in their homes 
and businesses.
Most important for rebels in the twenty-first strategy is not any par-
ticular strategy, movement or organization, but continual challenge. 
Imagination, skill, and effective efforts flow from lucid consciousness and 
correct analysis. Rebellion need not require life-and-death dedication, 
but it does require intelligent application. To rebel humanizes everyone. 
I rebel, therefore we are!
